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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After the decision of the Supreme Court in the first appeal of this case, a motion was made to 
disqualify the judge without cause. Arguments were held and briefs were written. The district 
judge ruled it was not necessary for him to disqualify himself. 
About a year later the district judge rendered a new decision which allegedly covered the 
issues the Supreme Court said needed to be addressed. Prior to this decision the district comt 
made no contact with counsel, nor were any requests for infonnation or even notice of what the 
court was doing ever given. 
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed. The matter was argued and the 
motion was denied. From the above facts this Appeal was taken. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court erred in not granting Defendant's motion to disqualify 
without cause. 
2. Whether the District Court erred in not properly addressing damages. 
3. Whether the District Court erred in not properly finding the value of the land. 
4. Whether the District Court erred in its determination of the amount of land damaged. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court's findings of fact in a court-tried case will be liberally construed on appeal in 
favor of the judgment entered, in view of the district court's role as trier of fact. Western 
Heritage Ins. Co. v. Green, 137 Idaho 832, 835, 54 P.3d 948, 951 (2002) (citing Conley v. 
Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 269, 985 P.2d 1127 (1999); Lindgren v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854, 857, 
949 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1997)). Review of the decision is limited to ascertaining whether the 
evidence supp01ts the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of 
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law. Id. If the findings of fact are based on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is 
conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Id. However, this Court exercises free review 
over questions of law. Id. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Attorney fees may be awarded on appeal under I.A.R.41 and LC. §12-121. Attorney fees 
should be awarded to the Appellant because the appeal brought out all the legal mistakes in the 
law made by the district judge. Because of the above Appellant should be deemed the prevailing 
party on Appeal. Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406,659 P.2d 160 (Ct.App.1983). 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
A. FAILURE TO DISQUALIFY WITHOUT CAUSE 
On January 3, 2007, the Defendant timely filed a Motion to disqualify the district judge who 
originally tried this case. (C.R.P. p.3) On May 30, 2007, the district judge issued a 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY. (C.R. P. p.19-22) Basically the district court stated it did not need to disqualify 
itself because of its interpretation of the case of Liebelt v. Liebelt, 125 Idaho 302 (Ct.App. 1994) 
and judicial economy. (C.R.P. p.20) These two issues will next be examined to see if they are 
valid. 
The district court stated Plaintiffs objection to the motion to disqualify was well taken 
because the Liebelt case was "authority to deny the motion because the case was not remanded 
for a new trial, merely for additional finding of fact. This court agrees, and therefore denies the 
motion". (C.R.P. p.20) The distdct court went on to say "The Idaho Court of Appeals reached 
the same conclusion in Liebelt. There, the Court held the rule did not apply when a case was 
remanded for additional findings of fact, 125 Idaho at 305. The Court of Appeals held that it is 
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not a "new trial" for operation of the rnle. This case was also remanded for additional finding of 
fact, not for a new trial. In that regard this case and Liebelt are very similar, and similar results 
should obtain. The court will not grant the motion to disqualify." (C.R.P. p. 20) 
The Supreme Court stated this case was remanded for "further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion". Ransom v. Topaz, 143 Idaho 641, 647 (2006). The Supreme Court also stated "the 
case must be remanded back to tbe district court for further findings of fact." Id. at 645. The 
district court conducted no further findings of fact. 
The district court erred by misinterpreting I.R.C.P. Rule 40(d)(l). The basic premise of the 
rule is set forth under Rule 40( d)(l )(A). It states "any party may disqualify one (I) judge by 
filing a motion for disqualification, which shall not require the stating of any grounds therefore, 
and such motion for disqualification, if timely, shall be granted." The rule then goes on to tell 
what one must do in various circumstances, i.e. what is the time limit to file, when there are 
multiple parties, or new parties, or a new judge, or a new trial, or an alternate judge or how to 
serve a judge the notice and finally the exceptions to the rule. (Rule 
40(d)())(B)(C)(D)(E)(F)(G)(H)(I)) Rule 40(d)(l)(F) simply states what one does when a new 
trial is ordered, nothing more. It certainly does not say if the Supreme Court remands a matter 
back to the trial judge the trial judge cannot be disqualified. The rule simply states how to 
disqualify the Judge if a new trial is ordered in the remand by the Supreme Court. The basic 
premise of the rule still applies, i.e. one may disqualify a judge without cause. "the purpose of 
the rule permitting disqualification of a judge without cause is "to insure a fair tribunal by 
allowing a party to disqualify a judge thought to be unfair or biased."" (In the matter of the 
application of: Herb Arthur dba Herb's Towing, Herb Arthur v. Shoshone County, 33 Idaho 854, 
857(App.) citing Jahnke v. Moore, 112 Idaho 944, 946 (Ct.App.1987). 
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The district court also misinterpreted the Liebelt case. This misinterpretation probably arose 
from the following language found in Liebelt: "However, we did not remand the case for a "new 
trial". As our opinion makes clear, we remanded the case for the limited purpose of having the 
magistrate make additional written findings on particular issues of fact which had already been 
tried before him. Accordingly, Rule 40(d)(l)(F) did not apply to grant Kenneth an automatic 
right to disqualify the magistrate without cause". The above language is somewhat ambiguous. 
No new trial was ordered so obviously Rule 40(d)(l)(f) is not applicable. However the language 
does imply since the Supreme Court did not order a new trial and only ordered written findings 
of fact one cannot be granted, even if timely request is made, a disqualification of the trial judge. 
To follow this interpretation is absolutely contrary to Rule 40( d)(l )(A) and the purposes of the 
rule found in the above cited cases of Arthur and Jahnke. 
The motion to disqualify was also denied in the Liebelt case because it was not timely filed. 
The district court also denied the motion to disqualify on the grounds of judicial economy. 
Neither the Rules nor the cases speak of judicial economy. They speak of judicial fairness. The 
day judicial fairness gives way to judicial economy will be a sad day indeed. 
B. DAMAGES 
In the Supreme Court's opinion it remanded the case because the district court "improperly 
measured actual damages for Lower's trespass." Ransom v. Topaz, 143 Idaho 641, 647 (2006). 
The Supreme Court stated there were two separate matters the district court did wrong and thus 
must conduct "further proceedings consistent with this opinion" to complete the matter. Id. at 
647. Those two matters are as follows: (1) The district court "failed to distinguish between 
damages attributable to Lower's permissible trespass to create or maintain an access road and 
damages attributable to excessive intrusion exceeding the scope of the easement" and, (2) to 
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distinguish "between costs to repair temporary damage and an award of damages for permanent 
damage to the property". Id. at 647. Unf01iunately the district court erred when it attempted to 
measure the actual damages and those errors shall next be considered. 
In regards to the first matter set forth above, the district court ruled there were a number of 
damages which did arise from the modifications of the easement. Those include erosion, 
sloughing caused by cuts made on Plaintiffs land out side the easement, removal and deposit of 
soil on Plaintiffs land, failure to install culve1is, and mitigate the altered and increased flow of 
water onto Plaintiffs land outside the easement. As a result of the above the district court gave 
two examples of the injury caused, i.e. "50% of precipitation does not percolate into the newly 
graveled area and thus causes erosion and water intrusion onto Plaintiffs land and the sloughing 
caused by the increase of water has rendered the land useless for building aud cultivating". 
(C.R.A. p.24, last paragraph) 
The main issue relating to these findings is the question of whether they are supported by any 
facts. Before going into these issues it is import for this Court to look at the Clerk's Record on 
Appeal. It will reveal the only thing heard by the district court prior to its Memorandum 
Decision & Order filed on 12-5-07 were matters relating to Appellant's Motion to Disqualify. 
No new evidence was requested by the district court nor was auy hearing held concerning what 
need be done because of the remand. The probable reasons for this are set out in the district 
court's Memorandum Decision aud Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Disqualify. (C.R.A. 
p.19-21) In this decision the district court stated "The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court does 
not order a new trial. It remands the case back to this Court for additional findings of fact on the 
measure of damages for trespass. This Court has previously heard the evidence in this case and 
made the findings which are to be supplemented. This Comi is in the best position to make those 
Page 5 of 13 
additional findings". (C.R.P. p. 20) From these statements it is apparent the Court did not want, 
and thought it did not need, any more hearings or evidence. This would seem to mean only 
evidence given in the original trial can be relied on by the district court to reach its facts and 
conclusions. 
Having set forth the district court's distinction between damages done in the permissible 
trespass and those done by the impermissible trespass, the Court then moved to the second matter 
requested by the Supreme Court. This issue broadly distinguishes between cost of temporary 
damages and permanent damages. 
The district court found the Plaintiff did not prove any permanent or temporary damages. 
(C.R.W. p.27, line 3) The Court then went on to say under the authority of Nampa & Meridian 
Irrigation Dist. No.131, 139 Idaho 28 (2003), since the value of the land had been proven the 
Court could award damages. The Court awarded $26,600.00 for damages. (C.R.W. p.27, 2d 
paragraph) This sum was determined by finding "approximately 7 acres were injured and the 
land is valued at $3,800 per acre for a total value of $26,600.00". (C.R.W. p.26, last full 
sentence) This ruling by the district court creates the issue as to whether a court can assess 
damages if none were proven by the Plaintiff. The district court says it can assess damages even 
if Plaintiff did not prove any damages under the authority found in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation 
Dist. No.131. Id. 
In its first statement under ANALYSIS the Supreme Court stated the general rule that "a trial 
court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous". Nampa 
& Meridian Irrigation Dist. No.131. Id at 32. The district court found Plaintiff had not proven 
any permanent or temporary damages. It is assumed these finding of fact would not be set aside. 
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However, the district court later went on to say that while no permanent damages were 
proven the Court was going to award temporary damages, saying the cost to restore the land to 
it's pre-injury state was more than the land's value so the Court would reduce the award "to the 
estimated value, that being $26,000.00". (C.R.W. p.27-28, under the Comi's Order) The comi in 
the Nampa Case does not say if no damages were proven by the Plaintiff the trial court can, 
without proof, assess damages. 
In the Nampa case, after reviewing the measure of damages to land which was permanently 
injured or temporarily injured, the Supreme Court went on to say "the rule precluding recovery 
of restoration costs in excess of the diminution in value is not of invariable application". Id. at 
34. Assuming any of this is relevant, which this writer believes it is not because of the prior 
ruling of the district court, what is the meaning of the words "diminution in value is not of 
invariable application"? The Supreme Court cited authority from which the meaning is derived. 
The Orndorff Case stated "Restoration costs may be awarded even though they exceed the 
decrease in market value if there is a reason personal to the owner for restoring the original 
condition or where there is reason to believe that the parties will, in fact, make the repairs". 
Orndorff v. Christian County Builders, 217 Cal.App.3d 683, 266 Cal.Rptr. 193, 195 
(Ct.App.1990). The County of Weld Case explained this doctrine to greater length. "Market 
value before and after the injury is ordinarily a rule applied to measure damages to real property. 
Since the goal of the law of compensatory damages is reimbursement of the plaintiff for the 
actual loss suffered, there may, of course, be instances in which repair or restoration costs may 
be a more appropriate measure such as (1) where the property has no market value, (2) where 
repairs have already been made, or (3) where the property is a recently acquired private residence 
and the plaintiffs interest is in having the property restored, repair costs will more effectively 
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return him to the position he was in prior to the injury". (The Board of County Commissioners of 
the County of Weld, State of Colorado v. John P. Slovek, Sr., John P. Slovek, Jr., Gary W Slovelc 
and Michael S. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Colo.1986) 
None of the above applies to this case. The Plaintiffs' bought the land "with the intent of 
building some summer cabins up there for us as the members of the group and possibly over on 
this particular area that we are talking about, selling this area and some of the frontage ground. 
We wanted to be back more over the hill, back into the background and so we were · 
contemplating using this as a way to recap part of our investment. As .has been stated, there is 
some very good ground there. There is also a hill that sluffs. The ground that is very good is 
back up against the trees." (R.T. day 3 of trial, testimony of Mr. Earnest Robert Rauzi, p. 166, 
L.7-13) No cabins were built and no land was sold prior to the trial. As stated, the good land 
was up against the trees. This was not land involved in the litigation. The land in litigation was 
below the hill that sluffs. During the first appeal of this case all of the Plaintiffs' land was sold. 
This land bought by the Plaintiffs' was investment land bought with ma.inly the idea of making 
more money. The potential abuse of this measure of damages was set out in the County of Weld 
case where it was stated "obviously, to the extent that a property owner is allowed to recover 
costs of restoration that are greater than the diminution in market value, there is the possibility 
that the owner will receive a monetary windfall by choosing not to restore the property and by 
selling it instead, profiting to the extent that restoration costs recovered exceed the diminution of 
market value". (County of Weld, Id. p.1317) In its motion for reconsideration the district comi 
was requested to have the Plaintiff disclose the amount received from the sale of the land. 
(C.R.A. p.35) The district court denied the request. (C.R.A. p. 39) It is for these reasons the 
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principles involving restoration costs are not applicable and these cases and their rulings 
certainly do not allow a trial court to award damages which have not been proven. 
Even though the district court stated the Plaintiff had not proven any pennanent or temporary 
damages it went ahead and awarded $26,600 in damages to Plaintiff. As pointed out earlier it 
did this by saying the land was worth $3,800.00 per acre and multiplying it by 7, the alleged 
number of acres damages. These findings are not only contradictory to the Courts own findings 
but are also an abuse of the Court's discretion. In the three part test to detennine an abuse of 
discretion the district court failed to meet the second part of the test. See Bybee v. Isaac, 1788 
P.3d 606, 145 Idaho 251 (2008). In this regard the district court did not act within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it. More examples of this abuse are contained in the following topics 
marked C and D. 
C. VALUE OF LAND 
There was no testimony the land had a value of$3,800.00 per acre. This figure was stated by 
Bob Rauzi. He said the land had been owned since 1983, it had been up for sale for 
approximately 5 years, no one had put any earnest money on the land and its asking price was 
$3,800.00 per acre. (Tr. 7/21/04, p.168-169) Mr. Rauzi also testified, as owner of the land, he 
thought the land was worth $10,000.00 to $50,000.00 an acre. (Tr. 7/21/04, p.167) He based his 
values of the Franklin County property on property located in Island Parle (Tr. 7/21/04, p. 166) 
It should also be noted in the original decision of this case by the Supreme Court, the Court also 
erred by stating "while there is some indication in the record that the property was about ten 
acres in size and was valued at approximately $3,800 per acre the judge made no determination 
about how much property was actually damaged or what the value of the property was". 
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(Ransom v. Topaz, 143 Idaho 643, 645.) While this hint of the amount and value of the land is 
interesting, it is not based on any facts. This may also be a reason the district court erroneously 
placed a value of $3,800.00 per acre on the land. The law must be kept in mind. "Generally, the 
Plaintiff in a trespass action has the burden to prove a causal connection between the 
Defendant's. alleged wrongful conduct and the Plaintiffs injury, as well as the extent of the 
injury sustained." Nelson v. Holdaway Land and Cattle Co., 107 Idaho 550, 552, 691 P.2d. 796 
(Ct.App.1984). "Damages, and the amount thereof, must be proven to a reasonable certainty." 
Wingv. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912,919 (Ct.App.1984) 
The defendant, Mr. Lower, offered to purchase 20 acres of the land owned by Farr West 
situated near his easement for $650.00 per acre. (Tr.7/21/04, p.116) 
Mr. Allen E. Burris, who was qualified as an expert in land appraisals, testified the Farr West 
land had a value of $600.00 per acre, and he provided a written appraisal to support his opinion. 
(Tr. 4/27/05, p.140-141) and (exhibit QQ) 
No other testimony was presented as to land values. All of these land values were based on 
pre-trespass values. No values were testified to as to pre-trespass and post-trespass. Presumably 
that is why the district court found no damages had been proven. 
The district court breached its discretion when it awarded damages based on the asking sale 
price at the time of trial. Certainly asking price has nothing to do with fair market value of land. 
One of the reasons for remand of the first appeal of this case was "the court failed to detennine 
the fair market value of the land". (Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P. 143 Idaho 641, 645) The 
only real evidence given as to the fair market value of the land was given by the appraiser, Mr. 
Burris, who testified the land had a value. of $600.00 per acre. This is the value the court should 
have placed on the land prior to the trespass. There was no testimony as to market value after the 
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trespass. Thus the court had no evidence of any decrease in market value of the land and could 
not then compare any decrease in land value with restoration costs. 
D. AMOUNT OF LAND DAMAGED 
There was no proof seven acres of the land were damaged. The only evidence of the amount 
of land damaged was given by Thomas Kass Biggs. His testimony was based on a picture he 
was looking at and went as follows: 
Q. Okay. And how many acres does that involve, do you know? 
A. I would approximate maybe 6, 7 acres. I am not good with land. 
Q. IfI were to represent to you that this whole thing from here to here, around where the 
trees are and down here is approximately 7 acres? 
A. Okay. 
Q: Then you are talking about maybe a fourth of it at the most? 
A. Yeah. I would say so. Maybe a third 
Mr. Biggs' testimony implies there was damage to land, i.e. he intended to repair, one-fourth 
of seven acres, or 1.75 acres. This is the only evidence of the amount of land damaged. The 
district court could, in its discretion, adopt this finding. The district comi did abuse its discretion 
by saying a total of seven acres was damaged. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court improperly handled the remand heretofore ordered by the Supreme Court. 
The first error was in denying the motion to disqualify without cause. If the motion had been 
granted and a new judge appointed to hear the case the odds are the case would have been 
resolved and no appeal filed. 
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The Supreme Court asked the district comi to do two things. The district court tried to do 
these two things but ended up in a quagmire. It found the Plaintiff had not proven any 
pennanent or temporary damages. Then the court reversed itself and assessed damages using the 
wrong amount of land damaged and incompetent evidence supporting the court's value of the 
land before the trespass. There was no evidence of the lands decrease in value after the trespass. 
It is requested the district court's decision be partially set aside and the case dismissed with 
prejudice because there was no proof of any perrnanent or temporary damages. In the alternative 
this court could remand the case with an order to award damages by valuing the land at $600.00 
per acre and multiplying this by 1.75 acres for the sum of $1,050.00. This would be more cost 
effective for all the parties than a remand to detem1ine the exact damages. 
Dated this 15th day of January, 2009. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of January, 2009, in accordance with the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellant Rules, I mailed two true and con-ect copies of the foregoing 
Briefto the following by placing the same in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon: 
F. Randall Kline 
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED 
P.OBox 397 
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